Measuring Scale Economies in a Heterogeneous Industry: The Case of European Settlement Institutions by Patrick Van Cayseele & Christophe Wuyts
“MEASURING SCALE ECONOMIES IN
A HETEROGENEOUS INDUSTRY: THE CASE OF
EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS”
by
Patrick Van Cayseele and
Christophe Wuyts
SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum
Vienna 2006
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 1CIP
MEASURING SCALE ECONOMIES IN A HETEROGENEOUS INDUSTRY:
THE CASE OF EUROPEAN SETTLEMENT INSTITUTIONS
By Patrick Van Cayseele and Christophe Wuyts
Vienna: SUERF (SUERF Studies: 2006/3)
ISBN-10: 3-902109-33-5
ISBN-13: 978-3-902109-33-5
Keywords: Technical Efficiency in Settlement and Safekeeping, Estimating Cost Functions
on Panel Data, Sample Heterogeneity and Fixed Effects.
JEL Classification Numbers: C8, D2, G2, L8
© 2006 SUERF, Vienna
Copyright reserved. Subject to the exception provided for by law, no part of this publication
may be reproduced and/or published in print, by photocopying, on microfilm or in any other
way without the written consent of the copyright holder(s); the same applies to whole or
partial adaptations. The publisher retains the sole right to collect from third parties fees
payable in respect of copying and/or take legal or other action for this purpose.
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 2MEASURING SCALE ECONOMIES IN A HETEROGENEOUS













Tel: +32 16 326830
Fax: +32 16 326796
e-mail: patrick.vancayseele@econ.kuleuven.be





* The authors would like to thank three anonymous referees for their valuable remarks and
contributions. This gratitude extends to participants of the annual SUERF meeting in Brussels on
November 30, 2005, as well as seminar participants at EB, CEPR, the EARIE conference in Porto,
the ENCORE Summer School on Advanced Industrial Economics at the University of Amsterdam
and the workshop of the Monetary and Information and Economics and Licos research groups at
the Catholic University of Leuven. More in particular, comments received by Paul Bodart, Hans
Degryse, Joep Konings, Jan De Loecker, Paolo Ricci and Anso Thiré have been appreciated. All
remaining errors are entirely our responsibility.
1 Universiteit van Amsterdam, Roeterstraat 11, NL-1018 WB Amsterdam, The Netherlands
2 K.U. Leuven, Department of Economics, Naamsestraat 69, 3000 Leuven, Belgium
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 33_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 4Abstract
We  examine whether the European settlement institutions are technically
efficient. This is done by means of estimating a translog cost function, and
investigating whether scale economies are fully exploited. Since the sample
is quite heterogeneous, fixed effects regression is introduced. From the results
obtained, there clearly are economies of scale in this industry throughout all
output ranges. This implies that further consolidation in this industry probably
is ahead.
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Nowadays, the securities settlement and safekeeping industry is subject to
much debate. More in particular, the discussion concerns the way in which the
industry should be organised in the future. Compared to the American market,
the European one still is quite fragmented. Basically, there was one central
securities depository (CSD) institution in each country that would also offer
settlement services for domestic securities. Only recently some cross-border
CSDs consolidation has taken place, but several national institutions continue
to co-exist, mainly due to the existence of different systems, legal procedures,
fiscal regimes, etc. This fragmentation might give rise to additional costs and
risks, and therefore a reduction of the number of settlement and safekeeping
institutions might be welfare increasing.
More in particular, the issue is whether consolidation should be encouraged,
and if so, what kind of consolidation is preferable. In Europe, two
consolidation trends can be observed. These trends are shown in figure 1.
First, there was a vertical consolidation movement. Here, the institutions that
are active in the trading, clearing, settlement and safekeeping process have
been integrated into one single institution. An example of this structure,
which is sometimes called a vertical silo, is Deutsche Börse, which
incorporates the trading platform, the clearing institution (Eurex Clearing)
and the settlement and safekeeping institution (Clearstream) into one holding.
The second type of consolidation that has taken place was horizontal,
implying a cross-border integration and cooperation between institutions that
provide similar services and products. An example of this is Euronext at the
level of securities trading, and Euroclear at the level of settlement and
safekeeping. The first is a merger of the French, Belgian, Dutch and
Portuguese stock exchanges, while the latter acts as a Central Securities
Depository (CSD) for France, Belgium, UK, Ireland and the Netherlands.
Efficiency
Further consolidation in this industry might give rise to higher efficiency and
lower operating costs. The present contribution investigates whether this
reduction in operating costs is feasible, and whether the current structure of
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3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 10the industry is efficient or not. In the last case, further consolidation is to be
expected.
Consolidation in this industry however raises many questions regarding
competition, that is allocative efficiency. For example, exchanges and CSDs
work together very tightly. More in particular, all trades that are concluded at
an exchange are settled most of the time by only one CSD. This implies that,
in order to be able to trade, all members of an exchange need either
a securities account with the CSD or to appoint an agent bank that has an
account with the CSD. These holdings therefore occur directly or through an
intermediary. Whenever two members of an exchange want to respectively
buy and sell, the CSD receives automatically (often through a central
counterparty that will perform clearing and netting activities) an instruction to
debit the securities account of the seller and to credit the buyer’s securities
account. This process is called straight through processing. Of course, over
time, this relation between the exchange and the CSD can change, and
depending on the magnitude of the switching costs could lead to alternating
arrangements. In a theoretical paper, Tapking and Yang (2004) conclude that,
under certain assumptions, a horizontal integration of CSDs lead to a higher
welfare than a vertical integration of exchanges and CSDs, while the vertical
integration seems to provide a higher welfare than a completely separated
industry configuration.
Also Van Cayseele (2005) comes to the conclusion that further horizontal
consolidation of the European clearing and settlement industry should be
encouraged. He introduces the two-sidedness of the market by investigating
a model of platform competition in the spirit of Rochet and Tirole (2003), and
shows that both investors and issuers gain from consolidation. Finally, Köppl
and Monnet (2004) use mechanism design to investigate the incentives for
further consolidation. Clearly then most, if not all, of the results of economic
modelling favour further horizontal consolidation. But whether technical
efficiency gains will reinforce this conclusion is a different question, which
only can be answered by empirical analysis.
Schmiedel, Malkamäki and Tarkka (2002) provide an empirical analysis of
the industry by estimating a cost function. However, as will be discussed in
section 3, they obtain some remarkable results. For one thing, the estimates of
the coefficients of the translog cost function specification come with the signs
opposite of the ones expected (this would for example lead to the
counterintuitive conclusion that total costs decrease when output is
increased), although they are often not statistically significant. By applying
Introduction 11
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and “within” variation in the observations as a source of differences in
decision making of the players in the sample. In the present contribution, we
investigate the possibilities of taking into account the information that an
observation has been generated by a particular CSD rather than by another, by
applying fixed effects regression to the problem.
Safety
It should also be noted that in order to guide policy making, it is not sufficient
to look at efficiency alone. One should also take into consideration the safety
of the settlement procedure. As discussed in the Bank of International
Settlements report (1992), the so-called “Delivery versus Payment”
procedure is preferred when trades are settled. This procedure ensures that
securities are transferred if and only if payment occurs. In this way, the
principal risk, which is the risk that the seller of a security delivers a security
but does not receive payment or that the buyer of a security makes payment
but does not receive the security, is avoided. This risk is the largest source of
credit risk in securities settlement.
Delivery versus Payment does not eliminate other sources of risk which are
the replacement cost risk and the liquidity risk. The former is the risk that
a counterparty to an outstanding transaction for completion at a future date
will fail to perform on the settlement date. The latter implies that
a counterparty will not settle an obligation for full value when due, but on
some unspecified date thereafter. It could be expected that when consolidation
takes place, these risks can be reduced because given the size of these
institutions these kind of defaults are less likely to take place and may be
internalised to a further extent.
Besides academic interest, the clearing and settlement industry also has
attracted the attention of policy makers, notably the European Commission.
In the “Communication to the Council and the European Parliament” (2004),
the Commission states that an integrated and efficient capital market is
essential for Europe. A crucial element in this process is the safety and
efficiency of the procedures that occur to finalise a security transaction. The
Commission argues that the clearing and settlement process is therefore
fundamental for the proper functioning of securities markets. In this
Communication, the Commission also proposes some actions it wants to take
in order to improve the clearing and settlement arrangements and to tackle the
barriers that are identified by the Giovannini reports (2001, 2003).
12 Introduction
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the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities
Commissions (IOSCO) make in their Consultative Report (2001) a number of
recommendations for securities settlement systems. One of these
recommendations concerns efficiency. It states that: “while maintaining safe
and secure operations, securities settlement systems should be cost effective
in meeting the requirements of the users” (Recommendation 15, p.20).
Also, the report argues that when the efficiency of settlement systems is
considered: “the needs of the users and the costs imposed to them must be
carefully balanced with the requirement that the system meets appropriate
standards of safety and security”. For instance, if a system is inefficient, this
might give rise to distortion on financial markets, while an unsafe settlement
system will not attract any participants. Therefore, efficiency of securities
settlement is an important issue, but a stable and safe environment is also
required. Regarding the latter, there might be a role for the regulatory
authorities. They could impose the standards to which every institution has to
comply. In this way, safety and stability can be enhanced, for instance by
setting deposit insurance and reserve requirements. A high level of these
requirements can however be inefficient, and thus the institutions incur
additional costs in complying with these regulations. The institutions in turn
then might pass these additional costs on to their customers, resulting in
higher fees. Therefore, a trade-off between safety and efficiency needs to be
made. Currently, various forms of taxes or regulation continue to co-exist in
the European Union, which again possibly and plausibly increase operating
costs.
CPSS has also published some reports with respect to payment systems.
A first one (2001) discusses the core principles for important payment
systems. It states that a well functioning payment system is essential for
a financial system to work appropriately. Therefore, 10 core principles to
which a payment system should comply are formulated. Another report
(2005) discusses some new developments in large-value payment systems.
Clearly, since new or enhanced features make the technical infrastructure of
these payments systems much more complex and the analysis of risks and
efficiency more difficult, these evolutions make investments in infrastructure
inevitable, and as a result, technical innovation will have a effect on operating
costs, and thus on the cost function.
The remainder of the present contribution is organised as follows. In the next
section, a brief discussion is given of what clearing, settlement and
Introduction 13
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given. In the fourth section, we explain the econometric approach that will be
followed, while in section 5 the data that are used are discussed. The
empirical results are given in section 6. Finally, section 7 concludes.
14 Introduction
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industry
In the literature, a lot of attention has been paid to the way in which trades at
an exchange are realised. However, little attention has been given to the
processes that occur after the completion of a trade. Before we proceed, it
might therefore be useful to explain what the processes performed by the
institutions in the clearing, settlement and safekeeping industry exactly are.
After a trade has been realised, basically three processes occur. The first one
is the clearing process. In the clearing stage, the obligations of the buyer and
the seller are determined. When trading is effected, sellers have the obligation
of delivering securities and the right of receiving cash, and buyers have the
obligation of paying cash and the right of receiving securities. The
transactions in financial markets can be cleared by a number of institutions,
for instance by a clearinghouse.
Aclearinghouse is a central location or central processing mechanism through
which financial institutions agree to exchange payment instructions or other
financial obligations, such as securities obligations generated by trading on an
exchange. Clearing can occur either on gross or on net positions. If the latter
is the case, a process of netting takes place. This is an agreed offsetting of
positions or obligations by trading partners or participants. The netting
reduces a large number of individual positions or obligations to a smaller
number of positions or obligations. More in particular, all gross positions are
offset against each other so that all outstanding positions in one given security
are converted to a single debit or credit.
It is also possible to trade with a central counterparty, which imposes itself in
between the buyer and the seller (novation). In this way, the different parties
remain anonymous to each other, and the parties don’t have to worry about
the credit risk of the respective counterparty. The IOSCO report (2004)
contains a number of recommendations with respect to central counterparties.
Given the large and growing role of these intermediaries in securities
settlement systems, the “central counterparties should be cost-effective in
meeting the requirements of participants while maintaining safe and secure
operations” (Recommendation 12, p.43). However, as argued in the report, an
assessment of the efficiency of these counterparties is very difficult, because
15
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of barriers to entry. A more comprehensive discussion of this problem can be
found in the CPSS report.
The focus of the present contribution however is on the next two processes,
namely settlement and safekeeping. During the settlement process, a transfer of
money is made from the buyer to the seller, while the delivery of the securities
goes in the opposite direction. Since most of the securities are dematerialised
nowadays, this delivery of money and securities is done through book-entries
instead of through physical delivery. The delivery is typically executed by
a Central Securities Depository (CSD) or an International Central Securities
Depository (ICSD), although local agent banks can settle trades internally when
a trade takes place between investors who happen to use the same local agent
bank. The main difference between a CSD and an ICSD is that the latter acts as
issuer-CSD (central depository) for international securities, while the former is
the issuer-CSD for domestic securities.
In the past, there was one CSD for each country. Recently, however, some
horizontal consolidation has taken place. Examples are Euroclear, which now
acts as the CSD for France, Belgium, the Netherlands and the United
Kingdom, and Nordic Central Securities Depository, which was established at
the end of 2004 as a consolidation between the Swedish and Finnish CSD.
The last process is the so-called safekeeping of securities. When the stock of
a company has been sold from investor A to investor B, B now holds a claim
on this company, while Adoes not hold one anymore. So the positions of both
A and B have changed. Both investors might also hold positions in stocks of
other companies in which they do not trade. So it is necessary to keep track
of all positions at each point in time, so as to enable a company to interact
with the entire group of its shareholders. This service is called custody and
concerns the safekeeping of the physical securities as well as the
administration on behalf of companies and investors (sometimes also called
assets servicing). Custody entails more than just keeping record of positions.
Sometimes assets needs to be serviced, for instance in the case of dividend
payments, stock splits, the emission of additional shares, etc. Often the
custody service is provided by the same institutions that also do the
settlement, namely the CSDs, ICSDs or any intermediary along the holding
chain. One can wonder whether this constitution should remain as it is, and
some have argued that in the case of CSDs and ICSDs it is preferable that the
settlement and safekeeping activities are separated. Based upon econometric
analysis, we will among other things try to find an answer to this issue.
16 The European clearing, settlement and safekeeping industry
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basically combine a two-sided network with a one-sided network, in the sense
of Economides and White (1994). Settlement is a two-sided network, since
the only way in which a transaction can be realised is by interaction between
the settlement institution and the investor on the one hand, and between the
investor and the settlement institution on the other. Asset servicing on the
other hand is a one-sided network, because a product involves the interaction
of two different parties, viz. an issuer and an investor – for instance, when
a company gives the CSD an instruction to pay a dividend. Van Cayseele and
Wuyts (2005) provide a more detailed explanation on this issue. They argue
that a combination of the two types of networks might lead to increased
efficiency and network externalities. However, whether this is the case has to
be investigated empirically.
The European clearing, settlement and safekeeping industry 17
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The literature survey can be short, since up to now little empirical research
has been done regarding the organisation of the European settlement and
safekeeping industry. Before dealing with the scarce contributions, it should
be noted that there are some papers that set up a theoretical model in order to
find an indication of the future structure of the industry, see for instance Van
Cayseele (2005), Tapking and Yang (2004), Rochet (2005), Holthausen and
Tapking (2004) and Kauko (2005). From a policy perspective, the Committee
on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) has written a number of
extensive reports concerning payments systems (2001, 2005), while CPSS
together with the Technical Committee of the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) have made a number of recommendations
for securities settlement systems (2001). Also, the European Commission
(2004) has proposed a number of measures and policies in order to improve
clearing and settlement arrangements.
Currently, only two empirical papers have been written with respect to this
industry. The seminal empirical paper was written by Schmiedel, Malkamäki
and Tarkka (2002). They estimate a translog cost function to examine whether
or not economies of scale are present in this industry. To capture output, they
use the number of securities settled as a proxy for the settlement services
provided by a CSD, while the safekeeping service is approximated by the
value of securities deposited in the system. As an input price, they use GDP
per capita of the country in which the CSD is active. The results obtained are
remarkable. More in particular, the estimated coefficients of the output
variables have a negative sign, which implies that total costs decrease as
output increases. Such results are at odds with received microeconomic
theory. The input price variable also has a negative sign. In addition, estimates
are very insignificant, so it is hard to draw any conclusions at all.
Nevertheless, based upon their results, they indicate that economies of scale
are present in this industry, especially for the smaller institutions.
Van Cayseele and Wuyts (2005) attack the problems that emerged in the work
by Schmiedel et al. by using alternative output variables and input prices. As
output variables, they use the number of clients of a CSD to capture the
settlement service, while the number of securities held is used as a measure
of safekeeping. As argued above, this is closer to economic modelling of the
industry. Russo et al. (2004) already indicate that the account management
19
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settlement institutions.
As input prices, the price for labour is seen to equal the labour bill divided by
the number of employees, and the ratio of GDP relative to a fixed base year
is used to get a price indication of other inputs used in the settlement and
safekeeping process. Van Cayseele and Wuyts also estimate a translog cost
function, and obtain that total operating expenses of the CSDs increase with
both output variables, of which one is highly significant. Moreover, they find
evidence that large economies of scale exist with respect to the output
variables. Van Cayseele and Wuyts also examine whether economies of scope
are present. More in particular, they investigate whether the joint production
of settlement and safekeeping gives rise to efficiency gains. Since the translog
cost function is not stable to verify this property (see Röller (1990a) and
Röller (1990b)), they estimate a constant elasticity of substitution – quadratic
(or CES-Q) cost function. The results indicate that the separation of
settlement and safekeeping activities causes a cost increase for the
institutions.
Another important remark that needs to be made is the fact that CSDs are very
heterogeneous. First of all, they perform the settlement and safekeeping
activities on quite a different scale. This can be seen below when the
descriptive statistics of the sample are discussed (see table 2). Moreover, the
CSDs might execute the before mentioned activities in a different way. Thus,
their technologies may differ, for instance because of a different legal and
institutional framework. This implies that their production function might not
be exactly the same. This can be seen from figure 2, where the ICSDs are
clearly on a different average cost curve. To control for this sample
heterogeneity, it is possible to apply a fixed effects regression, since adding
dummies and then apply OLS is not best econometric practice.
In the fixed effects model the firm-specific effects are estimated as constant
numbers. More in particular, the differences across institutions are captured in
differences in the constant term. It might be that these constant terms are
correlated with the exogenous variables. As is well known in the literature,
the fixed effects estimators are not influenced by heterogeneity bias. A more
detailed description of this estimation technique is provided in section 4.2.2.
20 Review of the literature
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 204. The model
4.1. Variables
To measure output, Schmiedel et al. use the number of securities settled in the
system to approximate the settlement services of the institutions, while the
value of securities held is used as a proxy for the safekeeping activities. As an
input price, they use the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. They
explain the use of this variable by the fact that this variable proxies the
differences in labour costs across countries. However, as argued in Van
Cayseele and Wuyts, this is a quite general measure to approximate the input
prices, and there might be a multicollinearity problem between the output
variables and this input price. More specifically, when stock markets boom,
stock valuations increase. This implies that value of the holdings by the
investors increase as well. As a result, they will be able to consume more, and
this might have a Pigou-effect on GDP. On the other hand, an increase in GDP
could be caused by a shift in trend growth, thus leading to increased sales and
profits. Since share prices depend on the expected future profits of the
companies, they can be assumed to increase as GDPincreases. As a result, the
valuation of the securities held will go up with GDP.
To avoid this multicollinearity problem, it is possible to use alternative input
and/or output variables. In this paper, we investigate to what extent the
problems encountered by Schmiedel et al. can be remedied, without using
alternative output variables.
As a dependent variable, Schmiedel et al. use the total operating expenses,
which consist of depreciation, labour costs and the so-called “other costs”. They
also include a dummy to indicate whether an institution is an ICSD or not.
In the empirical part of this paper, we will use the total operating expenses
including depreciation as well as a measure of the costs made by the
institutions that are active in the settlement and safekeeping industry. This
variable will be denoted by TC.
Concerning the output variables, the same variables as in Schmiedel et al. are
used. More in particular, the number of transactions settled is used and
referred to as Transet. The value of securities held is used as a proxy for the
safekeeping activities of the institutions, and denoted as VHold.
21
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results obtained by Schmiedel. et al. However, in order to avoid the above
mentioned problem of multicollinearity, an alternative specification will be
used in which two input variables are included, namely labour costs (Lc) and
other costs (Oc). As in Van Cayseele and Wuyts, these two input prices will
be approximated by the labour price, again calculated as the total labour costs
divided by the number of employees, and the ratio of GDP relative to a fixed
base year.
4.2. The translog cost function
4.2.1.Model specification
The following general form will be used for the cost function
ln(TC) = f[ln(Transet), ln(VHold); ln(Lc), ln(Oc)] (1)
This implies that total costs depend on the magnitude of the outputs, namely
the number of transactions settled (Transet) and the value of securities held in
safekeeping (VHold), and on input prices, being labour costs (Lc) and other
costs (Oc).
The cost function is specified as a translog cost function, see Christensen,
Jorgensen and Lau (1973). The logarithm of the total costs is approximated
by a second order Taylor expansion in the logarithms of outputs and input
prices. It is also possible to include other variables like time, but this variable
is not included in the model we specified. This type of cost function is often
used to analyse the cost structure of the banking industry.
Christensen et al. estimated the translog specification on data from regulated
US electricity producers, who have an obligation to supply. In settlement and
safekeeping, the number of settlements essentially is driven by activity on the
stock exchanges, while the value of deposits depends on asset pricing. Neither
the first nor the second is an output proxy that will be strongly affected by
decision making of management of the CSD. Reiss and Wolak (2005)
question the validity of regressions of costs on output in such environments,
and propose a specification which has the causality the other way around:
management decides on a budget (total costs) which explains the output
volume that can be reached. However, such an approach does not make sense
in a multiproduct environment. Moreover, in order to be able to compare our
22 The model
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use these output variables when the cost function is estimated.




whereby ICSD is a dummy variable to indicate whether an institution is an
ICSD or not, and ε is the error term, here assumed to be efficiency shocks
observed by the decision maker but unknown to the econometrician.
It is possible to add factor share equations to the cost function in (2). They are
obtained by relying on duality theory and applying Shephard’s lemma to the
translog cost function. More in particular, the following share equations hold:
(3)
In the share equations in (3), SLc and SOc reflect the share the input variables
labour costs and other costs have in the total operating expenses.
The model 23
3 We  assume, without loss of generality, that the coefficients of the interaction terms are
symmetric (β 12 = β 21 and δ 12 = δ 21). We will only use β 12 and δ 12 in the remainder of this paper.
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by means of the random effects technique. When the share equations in (3)
are added to the system, the cost function in (2) is estimated jointly with the
share equations in (3). This is done by applying the Seemingly Unrelated
Regression technique. As an alternative, one uses the fixed effects estimator
for the translog cost function in (2) to deal with the problem of sample
heterogeneity.
4.2.2. The fixed effects model
To estimate on panel data, fixed effects regressors are used. This is actually
merely a linear regression model in which the intercept terms vary over the
individual units. In this way, the individual heterogeneity is treated as
N parameters that are to be estimated. More in particular, the model that is
estimated has the following form.
yit = α i + β xit + ε it (4)
where i = 1, ..., N denotes the individuals (or the different institutions in our
case) and t = 1, ..., T denotes the number of time periods. The variable α i is
actually a set of N dummy variables and can be written as 
where dij = 1 if i = j and 0 elsewhere. Basically, a set of N dummy variables
is included in the model. The parameters can be estimated by ordinary least
squares (OLS), and the implied estimator for β is called the least squares
dummy variable estimator. The model in (4) can be seen as a more general
description of the translog cost function in (2) in which the dependent
variable is written as yit and the output variables, input prices and all
interaction terms are included in the matrix xit.
It is however not very attractive to have a regression model with so many
variables. Therefore, a transformation can be made. More specifically, exactly
the same estimator for β is obtained if the model is estimated in deviations
from the individual means. This implies that the individual effects α i are
eliminated. To do this, the Tobservations for each individual can be averaged:
y ¯i = α i + β x ¯i + ε¯i (5)
where  , and similarly for the other variables. Then, by combining
equations (4) and (5), it is possible to write:
24 The model
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The transformation that produces observations in deviation from individual
means, like in equation (6), is called the within transformation. The OLS
estimator for β that is obtained from this transformed model is defined as the
fixed effects estimator. The parameter estimates are exactly identical to the
least squares dummy variable estimator that was mentioned previously. The
individual effects can be estimated by applying the estimations for β to
equation (5).
Another possibility for the estimation of panel data is the random effects
model. In the fixed effects model, the individual effects are not of any interest.
The panel data model in equation (4) can however be rewritten in the
following way:
yit = µ+ β xit + (α i – µ) + ε it (7)
where  which implies that this is the average individual effect.
From equation (7) a new error term can be defined, namely uit = (α i – µ) + ε it.
So the error term now consists of two components, namely an individual
specific and permanent component (α i – µ) that does not vary over time, and
a remainder transitory component ε it that does vary over time and is assumed
to be uncorrelated over time. It can be proven that the estimation of the model
in equation (7) by means of OLS is inefficient and yields incorrect standard
errors. The random effects model can however be estimated efficiently by
generalised least squares (GLS). Again then, a transformation needs to be
done. For a more extensive description, see for instance Verbeek (2000) and
Hsiao (1996).
Whether the fixed effects model or the random effects model is the most
appropriate needs to be determined. The fixed effects model considers the
distribution of yit given α i, and the latter can be estimated. This is suitable if
the individuals in the sample can be viewed as “unique”, and thus can not be
seen as drawn randomly from an underlying population. The fixed effects
technique is thus the most appropriate when countries, companies or
industries are considered. Since the sample that is used in this paper consists
of institutions that are active in the clearing and settlement industry, this is
already a first indication to estimate the translog cost function in equation (2)
by means of the fixed effects model.
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test. This test compares the estimates from the fixed effects and the random
effects model. The null hypothesis is that the model is a random effects
model, which implies that α i and  xit are uncorrelated. The alternative
hypothesis says that the model is a fixed effects model, and thus it is possible
that  α i and  xit are correlated. One estimator, namely the fixed effects
estimator, is consistent under both the null and the alternative hypothesis,
while the other estimator, being the random effects estimator, is consistent
only under the null hypothesis




FE and  βˆ
RE denote the estimations from the fixed effects and the
random effects model respectively, and V ˆ denote estimates of the covariance
matrix. Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic in (8) has an asymptotic
Chi-squared distribution with K degrees of freedom, with K the number of
elements in β .
With the Hausman test statistic, we have an objective way to determine which
estimation technique should be used. In the empirical part of this paper, we
will use this technique to examine which estimation technique should be used
to estimate the translog cost function in (2).
4.2.3. Economies of scale
Economies of scale are calculated as follows:
(9)
In this equation, MC and AC represent respectively the marginal and the
average cost, and Q is output. When we apply this to the translog model in
(2), we obtain the following scale elasticity coefficients:
26 The model
4 Remind that in the random effects model, α i is the permanent component of the error term,
and the prerequisite for consistency is that the exogenous variables xit and the error term are
uncorrelated.
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In equations (10), ε Transet and ε VHold are the scale elasticity coefficients with
respect to the two output variables Transet and VHold. There are scale
economies if this elasticity is smaller than one, while there are diseconomies
of scale if it is larger than one.
When a multiproduct cost function is assumed, the overall economies of scale
are measured as follows:
(11)
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5.1. Data collection
The data set that is used to estimate the cost functions is collected from
several publications. The most important source was the annual reports of
the CSDs and ICSDs. In addition, the internet sites of the settlement and
safekeeping institutions made it possible to enlarge the data set with
respect to the output variables. Additional information was also acquired
from various issues of the European Central Bank Blue Book on payment
and securities settlement systems in the European Union and from the
Bank for International Settlement statistics on payment and settlement
systems. The data concerning the gross domestic product per capita were
obtained from the Datastream database. Finally, some institutions provided
us with (data from) annual reports that were not available on their website
anymore.
In their paper, Schmiedel et al. also include some North-American and Asian
CSDs. However, we prefer to focus only on the European settlement and
safekeeping industry, and therefore, only European CSDs are included in our
data set. The reason is that in order to guide policy-making in Europe, one can
better focus on the empirics of European institutions on their own. In a later
stage, European institutions overall then can be compared to their US or Asian
counterpart(s).
A number of annual reports were expressed in euro. However, some annual
reports are expressed in local currency, like in the United Kingdom, Denmark,
Sweden, Norway and Switzerland, while some older annual reports from
institutions that are active in countries in the eurozone were still expressed in
local currency. The numbers from these annual reports were converted to one
single currency, namely the euro (ECU before 1999), on the basis of the
exchange rate at the end of each year.
An overview of the settlement and safekeeping institutions that are included
in the sample, together with the respective annual reports, is given in table 1.
In total, 50 data points are included in our dataset.
29
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The descriptive statistics for each of the main input and output variables, as
well as those for total costs, are represented in table 2. For each variable, the
mean is given, as well as the median, the standard deviation, and the
minimum and maximum values.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
From the table, it is clear that sometimes large differences between the
institutions are present. Thus there is quite some heterogeneity present in our
sample, as already argued before. A first indication for this is when the
minimum and maximum values are compared. These differences can be
explained by the fact that the scale of the institutions in our sample is quite
diverse. For instance, the ICSDs Euroclear and Clearstream operate on
a much larger scale than for instance the Greek or Portuguese CSD, which
implies that they have to settle a multitude of transactions compared to the
smaller CSDs. Also, the value of the securities that the ICSDs hold in
30 Data
Settlement institution Country CSD/ICSD Annual reports
Crestco United Kingdom CSD 1997–2002
CSD Greece CSD 2002–2003
Interbolsa Portugal CSD 2001–2002
Monte Titoli Italy CSD 1994–2002
VP Denmark CSD 1994–2004
VPC Sweden CSD 2003–2004
VPS Norway CSD 2000–2004
Sisclear – SegaInterSettle Switzerland CSD/ICSD 2001–2004
Clearstream Germany/Luxemburg ICSD 2000–2004
Euroclear France/Belgium/Netherlands ICSD 2001–2004
Table 1: Sample of Settlement Institutions
TC Lc Oc Transet Vhold
Mean 127553642 43633592 67611066 24648007 2.1144*10
12
Median 22157561 10737984 9325736 8950000 3.9431*10
11
Std. Dev. 206338007 71649005 114113951 30159317 3.1852*10
12
Max 685692000 268697000 477186000 115000000 1.3100*10
13
Min 7176137 2421560 4148382 906920 6.5764*10
10
Skewness 1,7747 2,0283 2,0415 1,4704 1,8129
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ICSDs are much larger as well.
Moreover, the difference between the mean and the median is sometimes
quite significant, again pointing to scale differences. A statistical measure for
these differences is the skewness, which captures the asymmetry of the
distribution of the series around its mean. If a series has a positive skewness,
this means that the distribution has a long right tail, which is clearly the case
is our sample. Therefore, it might be more convenient to use the median
instead of the mean when the scale elasticities will be calculated. When the
median is used, outliers in the sample become less important.
5.3. Average costs
Average cost curves can be used as a first indication of cost efficiency. As
explained previously, two output measures are used, namely the number of
transactions settled and the value of securities held in safekeeping. The cost
in euro per unit of output is given in table 3.
Table 3: Average costs (in euro)
The first thing that can be noticed is that it costs the CSDs on average between
1.5 and 5 euro to settle a transaction. The average costs to the ICSDs to settle
a transaction is however significantly higher, namely somewhere between
5 and 10 euros. This can be explained by the fact that it is much more costly
to settle international transactions than domestic ones. The differences in
average costs between CSDs and ICSDs can also be seen when we plot the
average cost of all data points against the number of transactions settled. This
is done in figure 2. On the horizontal axis, the number of transactions settled
Data 31











3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 31is given, while the vertical axis represents the average cost in euro per
transaction settled.
Figure 2: Average cost (in euro) per transaction settled
32 Data
Figure 3: Average cost (in euro) for safekeeping one euro
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remarkable is that there seems to be two average cost curves. The lowest
average cost curve is that for the CSDs, while the highest curve reflects the
average costs for the ICSDs. This might reflect the fact that the activities of
ICSDs are hard to compare with those of CSDs, an argument that was already
put forward in Van Cayseele and Wuyts (2005).
Concerning the cost of safekeeping one euro, a distinction between CSDs and
ICSDs is harder to make on the basis of table 3, since the institutions seem to
be more or less equally cost efficient with respect to this output variable. In
figure 3, we plot the average cost against the value of securities held. The data
point to the right of a value of securities held of 6000 billion euro represent
the average costs of the ICSDs. Again, the CSDs and ICSDs are on a different
average cost curve. In addition, the average costs decrease swiftly with regard
to this output variable as well.
Data 33
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In this section, we estimate the translog cost model that was discussed in
section 4. First, we perform some basic regressions. Subsequently, the
different estimation techniques that were discussed are applied to the translog
cost function.
6.1. Some basic regressions
Before we estimate the full translog cost function, we first estimate some
basic regressions whereby we use a loglinear specification to total costs. The
output variables that will be used in the remainder of this empirical part are
separately and jointly regressed on total costs. In addition, a specification in
which the ICSD dummy variable is added is estimated as well. The results can
be found in table 4.
Table 4: Total costs regessed on output variables
Model 1a: ln(TC) regressed on 1 output variable (ln(Transet))
Model 1b: ln(TC) regressed on 1 output variable (ln(VHold))
Model 1c: ln(TC) regressed on both output variables
Model 1d: ln(TC) regressed on both output variables and ICSD dummy
It shows from table 4 that the variables used truly can be seen to be outputs
from the settlement and safekeeping process, in that they apparently are “cost
drivers” for the system. By this, we mean variables proxying output and
35
Explanatory Model 1a Model 1b Model 1c Model 1d
variables estimates estimates estimates estimates
c 2,2154 –4,1141 –2,7483 4,6236
(1.92) (–2.95) (–2.03) (3.55)
ln(Transet) 0,9460 0,3908 0,4013
(13.40) (3.17) (4.90)





2 0,7890 0,8348 0,8639 0,9414
Included observations 50 50 50 50
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 35correlated with total costs, yet orthogonal to the error term, as explained
above. Regarding the ICSD dummy, the cost driver interpretation equally
works, although here one can argue that ICSD is a direct characteristic of
banking output, putting it on the same level as the variables used in Van
Cayseele and Wuyts. For the moment, we leave the discussion as to how
ICSD should be interpreted as an avenue for further research.
The regressions in this table are done by means of ordinary least squares
(OLS). The t-values are reported in parenthesis. As can be seen, the t-statistics
are quite high, and the results are similar to those obtained by Schmiedel et al.
From the results, it seems that both variables can be used for further analysis.
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Table 5: Estimation of input and output variables
Model 2:  ln(TC) regressed on 2 outputs, their interaction term and ICSD dummy
Model 3:  ln(TC) regressed on 2 outputs, their interaction term, input price (GDPCap) and
ICSD dummy
Model 4a: ln(TC) regressed on 2 outputs, their interaction term; 2 alternative input prices
(ln(Lc) and ln(GDPratio)) and ICSD dummy
Model 4b: ln(TC) regressed on 2 outputs and interaction term, 2 alternative input prices and
interaction term and ICSD dummy
Explanatory Model 2 Model 3 Model 4a Model 4b
variables estimates estimates estimates estimates
c 29,5491 55,1115 35,4611 36,3090
(1.74) (3.78) (2.51) (2.56)
ln(Transet) –1,1469 –3,0984 –1,7856 –1,4618
(–1.09) (–3.32) (–2.03) (–1.51)
ln(VHold) –0,6998 –1,8786 –1,1979 –1,0257
(–1.10) (–3.34) (–2.24) (–1.78)
ln(Transet)*ln(VHold) 0,0574 0,1282 0,0815 0,0699









ICSD 1,2466 0,4071 1,0131 1,2207
(4.89) (1.54) (4.46) (3.59)
R
2 0,9441 0,9645 0,9636 0,9641
Included observations 50 50 50 50
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included, a problem already comes up. This can be seen in table 5. More in
particular, in model 2, the sign of the estimated output coefficients becomes
negative, while the interaction term has a positive sign. Moreover, the
estimations become insignificant, except for the ICSD dummy. Subsequently,
when the input variables are added, this problem continues to exist. These
results are similar to those obtained by Schmiedel et al. In model 3, we
include as input variable gross domestic product per capita (GDPCap). This
is the input variable that was also used by Schmiedel et al. However, as
mentioned before, there might be a multicollinearity problem when this
variable is used. Therefore, in model 4a, we include the alternative input
variables labour price Lc and a proxy for the price of other goods (inputs),
that is other costs, because it is hard to find a price for this latter variable. As
in Van Cayseele and Wuyts, the price of other costs will be proxied by the
ratio of GDP relative to a fixed base year (GDPratio), namely the beginning
of 1993. Every end of year value of GDP was then divided by this initial
number. In model 4b, the interaction term between the input price variables is
added as well. All estimations are done using OLS, and the t-statistics are
denoted in parenthesis.
6.2. Estimation of the translog cost function
In this section, the full translog cost function will be estimated. Like in table
5, the model will first be estimated using the input variable of Schmiedel et
al. These estimations are done in model 5. In this respect, it is worthwhile
recalling that the translog specification put forward in section 4 reads:
(12)
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equation (2) will be estimated, whereby the alternative input variables Lc and
GDPratio are applied. More specifically, equation (13) below will be
estimated:
(13)
Several estimation techniques are used to estimate the models. First, in the RE
models, the random effects GLS regression is used, while subsequently, the
fixed effects regression is executed in the FE models. In model 6, the
estimation results of the translog cost function whereby the Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique is used are given as well. Here, the
share equations (3) are added to the system. The results for model 5 can be
found in table 6, while the results for model 6 are represented in table 7. As
usual, the t-statistics are denoted in parenthesis. Also, three coefficients of
determination are reported, namely the within, the between and the overall
coefficient.
Model 5 RE in table 6 reproduces the results of Schmiedel et al. Like in their
estimation results, the output variables Transet and VHold have a negative
sign, which would imply that total operating costs would decrease as output
increases. Also, one of the squared output terms, namely (ln(VHold))
2, has
a negative sign, while in Schmiedel et al., both squared output terms are
negative. Concerning the output interaction term, we obtain a negative sign,
as it should be, as opposed to Schmiedel et al. Finally, the input price
variable lnGDPcap has a negative coefficient. However, aside from the
negative output coefficients, another defect is that neither in our estimation
results of model 5a, nor in the results of Schmiedel et al., almost any
38 Estimation results
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significance level.
When we apply the fixed effects regression, the results change however in
a remarkable way as can be seen in model 5 FE. One of the output variables,
ln(Transet), alters to a positive sign and is significant at the 10% level, both
squared output variables (ln(Transet))
2 and (ln(VHold))
2 are positive as well
and significant at respectively the 1% level, and the 5% level, and the output
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Table 6: Estimation of the translog cost function using GDP per Capita
Model 5 RE: Estimation of translog cost function (12) using random effects
Model 5 FE: Estimation of translog cost function (12) using fixed effects




























2 within 0,5926 0,7388
R
2 between 0,9958 0,6878
R
2 overall 0,9814 0,7434
Included observations 50 50
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the 5% level. The latter is an indication that the joint production of settlement
and safekeeping leads to efficiency gains. The input price variable now has
a positive sign as well, although it remains insignificant. Finally, in the fixed
effects regression, the ICSD dummy is dropped, given its incompatibility
with the fixed effects regression strategy.
Clearly, the fixed effects regression leads to much more sensible results than
the random effects regression. However, this does not provide evidence that
the fixed effects model should be preferred, although some intuitive reasons
were already mentioned in section 4.2.2. A more formal test can be used, viz.
the Hausman test. When this test statistic is computed, a value of 97.03 is
obtained. Under the null hypothesis that the differences in the estimated
coefficients are not systematic, this statistic follows a chi-squared
distribution. Clearly the null hypothesis has to be rejected, indicating that
there might be correlation between the permanent component of the error
term and the exogenous variables. Therefore, the fixed effects model is the
preferred one.
Table 7 reports the estimation results of the translog cost function of equation
(2). The alternative input prices are used instead of GDPcap because of the
reasons mentioned in section 4.1. First, in model 6 SUR, the SUR technique
is used, in which the translog cost function is estimated jointly with the share
equations. No conclusion can be reached since the estimated coefficients are
very insignificant. When we use the RE technique, as in model 6 RE, we see
that the estimation results improve strikingly, not only compared to the SUR
estimation, but also compared to the estimation results of model 5 RE
reported in table 6. This might be an indication that multicollinearity may be
present between the gross domestic product per capita and the value of
securities held in safekeeping. More in particular, the output variable
ln(Transet) is positive and almost significant at the 5% level, while the
squared output terms are positive and the output interaction term is negative,
although these are not significant. Also, one input price variable ln(Lc) is
positive as well. Thus, by including the alternative input prices ln(Lc) and
ln(GDPratio), it is possible to improve the results considerably.
When we now execute the fixed effects regression to the full translog cost
model, we obtain the results of model 6 FE. The sign of the estimated
coefficients stays unchanged compared to the random effects regression of
model 6 RE, but the t-statistics improve. More specifically, ln(Transet) is now
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Table 7: Estimation of the translog cost function using Lc and GDPratio
Model 6 SUR: Estimation of translog cost function (13) and share equations using
seemingly unrelated regression technique
Model 6 RE:  Estimation of translog cost function (13) using random effects
Model 6 FE:  Estimation of translog cost function (13) using fixed effects
Explanatory Model 6 SUR Model 6 RE Model 6 FE
variables estimates estimates estimates
c1 1,4005 144,3623 57,0669
(0.37) (2.87) (0.78)
ln(Transet ) –1,8770 11,9003 11,2245
(–1.30) (1.94) (2.08)
ln(VHold) 0,5032 –20,6030 –13,1923
(0.20) (–3.08) (–2.24)
(ln(Transet))
2 0,0000 0,4098 0,7589
(–1.06) (1.29) (2.90)
(ln(VHold))
2 –0,0714 0,3373 0,5901
(–0.65) (1.46) (2.72)
ln(Transet)*ln(VHold ) 0,1115 –0,3742 –0,5607
(2.05) (–1.44) (–2.84)
ln(Lc) 1,0433 10,2072 9,1142
(2.40) (0.92) (0.96)
ln(GDPratio) –0,2838 –36,4804 –16,6637
(–0.63) (–1.44) (–1.08)
ln(Lc)
2 0,0943 –3,8831 –1,1486
(2.01) (–2.24) (–1.05)
ln(GDPratio)
2 0,0433 0,9648 4,8239
(0.72) (0.80) (2.61)
ln(Lc)*ln(GDPratio) –0,0695 3,6240 1,1179
(–1.85) (2.00) (1.03)
ln(Transet)*ln(Lc) –0,0687 –0,7003 –0,6997
(–3.08) (–1.75) (–1.58)
ln(Transet)*ln(GDPratio ) 0,0161 –0,3853 –0,3330
(0.48) (–0.61) (–1.02)
ln(VHold)*ln(Lc) –0,0188 1,5891 0,5392
(–0.92) (3.69) (1.08)
ln(VHold)*ln(GDPratio) 0,0453 0,0208 0,2235
(1.48) (0.03) (0.48)
ICSD 1,7960 0,2225 (dropped)
(5.52) (0.23)
R
2 within 0,9371 0,4956 0,8132
R
2 between 0,9939 0,0305
R
2 overall 0,9822 0,0398
R
2 share Lc 0,5223
R
2 share Oc 0,2343
Included observations 50 50 50
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level. The results for the input prices are similar to those of the random effects
regression. Like in model 5 FE, the ICSD dummy is dropped.
This time, it is less clear that the random effects or the fixed effects model is
preferred, since the estimation results are similar. But a formal analysis shows
that a Hausman test statistic of 31.53 is obtained. Thus, the null hypothesis
has to be rejected once more and the fixed effects model is the preferred
model.
6.3. Economies of scale
The economies of scale are calculated for each output factor, and the overall
scale economies are calculated as well. This is done through the estimation of
the scale elasticities in equation (10) at the sample mean as well as at the
median. However, from table 2, it is clear that the sample is biased towards
the larger institutions (mainly the ICSDs). Therefore, only the results whereby
the mean is used are reported. Sometimes it might be useful to consider the
economies of scale along an expansion path. This can be done by regressing
the two output variables on each other. This was also done by Schmiedel et
al. The estimation results for this loglinear expansion path, namely
ln(VHold)=f(ln(Transet)), is reported in appendix A. As a result, the median
values of VHold are forecasted by this expansion path. The scale elasticities
indicate how total costs react if the output variables Transet and VHold are
increased. More in particular, they show how the cost per unit resulting from
an increased production of the service is reduced. Thus, when economies of
scale are present, average costs decrease as output increases.
To calculate the scale elasticities, the sample is divided into four quartiles.
This division occurred on the basis of the number of transactions settled. Q1
denotes the smallest institutions whereby Q4 are the largest ones. First, we
reproduce the scale elasticities introduced in Schmiedel et al. To do this, the
estimation results from model 5 RE in table 6 are used. The results can be
found in table 8. Next, we compute the scale elasticities according to the
estimation results from model 6 FE in table 7. As argued, this is the preferred
model. The results are given in table 9. In both tables, the t-statistics are
denoted in parenthesis to indicate whether an elasticity is significantly
different from one. The t-statistics are calculated by evaluating the elasticities
on each observation, then taking the standard error of these elasticities for
each group of institutions.
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The scale elasticities are calculated by taking the first derivative of the translog cost
function with respect to each output variable
There are scale economies if this elasticity is smaller than 1
Table 9: Economies of scale using model 6 FE
The scale elasticities are calculated by taking the first derivative of the translog cost
function with respect to each output variable
There are scale economies if this elasticity is smaller than 1
From table 8, it would seem that with respect to the number of transactions
settled, the smallest institutions are able to achieve enormous scale
economies, while even the largest institutions have a large potential for costs
savings. Also, with respect to the value of securities held, the CSDs in the
lowest quartile have a low scale elasticity, while the CSDs in the highest
quartile have an elasticity that is much closer to one. This quartile consists
mainly of observation of the two ICSDs, together with some observations of
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ε Transet ε VHold SE
Q1 0,0395 0,2383 0,2778
(7.42) (3.30) (3.69)
Q2 0,1521 0,3988 0,5509
(9.33) (2.87) (3.29)
Q3 0,3775 0,3504 0,7279
(2.75) (2.08) (1.52)
Q4 0,5062 0,8118 1,3180
(2.67) (0.54) (1.67)
ε Transet ε VHold SE
Q1 0,2423 0,0926 0,3349
(7.10) (5.79) (8.25)
Q2 0,2209 0,2901 0,5111
(4.38) (4.67) (10.86)
Q3 0,2616 0,3224 0,5839
(2.72) (3.04) (3.11)
Q4 0,3828 0,4362 0,8190
(8.99) (8.61) (2.92)
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last column in the table, economies of scale seem to exist for the CSDs in the
three lowest subsamples, while the largest subsample would incur
diseconomies of scale. However, no judgements should be made on the basis
of this table, since first of all, the t-statistics are quite low, and the overall
scale elasticity is not significant at the 5% level for this group. Moreover, as
discussed before, the estimations of this model may not be correct.
This becomes clear when we look at the results in table 9. The extent to which
there are economies of scale varies between institutions, but also between the
output variable that is considered. The three smallest subsamples have a more
or less equal potential for cost savings with respect to the number of
transactions settled, while the ICSDs can still exploit substantial cost savings
as well, although to a lesser extent than the other CSDs. Concerning the value
of securities held in safekeeping, the smallest CSDs have larger scale
economies for this output variable, while the opposite holds for the three other
quartiles. In addition, the overall scale elasticities are higher for the ICSDs,
but even these institutions still can obtain considerable cost savings. This
result clearly contradicts that of table 8, where the ICSDs seemed to suffer
from diseconomies of scale. Finally, the t-statistics indicate that all scale
elasticities, and even the sum of both, are significantly different from 1.
Therefore, further horizontal consolidation could be rationalised from
efficiency gains, at least when outputs are proxied by the variables used in
this study.
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The European settlement and safekeeping industry is currently examined
thoroughly by policy makers. The European Commission is investigating how
competition in this industry can be further encouraged and how post-trading
costs can be lowered in particular in order to reduce cross-border overall
trading to post-trading costs and create a true single European financial
market. While domestic settlement in Europe is rather cheap and aligned to
international standards, the settlement of cross-border trades is still quite
expensive. However, concerns regarding the revenues of the institutions must
be combined with concerns for the costs incurred by all the institutions and
investors that are involved in securities transactions.
The current settlement arrangements are efficient at the national level, but
they appear to be inefficient for cross-border trades. This is due to the fact that
in the past cross-border trading has been very limited, and as a result, most
attention was paid to the domestic infrastructure. Compared to domestic
settlement, the inefficiencies regarding the cross-border trades stem from the
absence of common technical standards, the existence of different business
practices and an inconsistent fiscal, legal and regulatory framework. This
increases costs and makes cross-border settlement also more complex than
the settlement of domestic trades.
Also the safety aspects for all involved parties deserve attention in this
respect. The reason is that the clearing and settlement systems are of critical
importance for a well functioning capital market, but also for financial
stability. They are important for capital markets because these systems
finalise securities transactions, and this needs to take place in an efficient and
secure environment in order to minimise the possibility that one of the parties
cannot fulfil its obligations.
In addition, market liquidity depends on the faith regarding the safety and
reliability of the settlement arrangements. Markets participants may not be
willing to trade anymore if they believe that there is a substantial possibility
that a trade will never settle. Moreover, weaknesses in securities settlement
systems can give rise to systemic disturbances in securities markets, and in
this way there might be some spillover effects to other payment and
settlement systems, affecting overall financial stability. If any of the
institutions that execute fundamental functions in the settlement process or
45
3_2006  8/11/06  2:34  Stránka 45even if a major user of the settlement system is faced with some financial or
operational problems, this will lead to serious liquidity pressures or credit
losses for the other participants. Thus, it is necessary that settlement systems
are stable and secure.
According to the report of the European Commission (2004), the securities
settlement systems are characterised by large economies of scale and scope.
Concerning the economies of scale, this result is confirmed in the empirical
analysis of this paper. In order to verify the existence of pronounced scale
economies, a cost function has to be estimated. Methodologically, although
the institutions that are active in the European settlement and safekeeping
industry area are quite different in terms of the underlying technology and the
nature of the outputs provided, a sensible cost function only can be estimated
provided that one properly takes into account this heterogeneity. More in
particular, by applying the fixed effects regression instead of OLS or
a random effects regression, we find that the signs of the estimated coefficient
become much more in line with the received microeconomics of production
theory. Also, contrary to the OLS estimation results, the estimated coefficients
in the fixed effects regression are significant at least at the 5% level.
With respect to the scale economies, we find that performing the fixed effects
regression or a random effects regression results in different conclusions. The
random effects regression suggests that the largest institutions would incur
diseconomies of scale since their overall scale elasticity coefficient is larger
than 1, although it is not significant. When we calculate the scale elasticity
coefficients by means of the estimated coefficients of the fixed effects
regression, which takes into account the heterogeneity between the
institutions, we can conclude that all institutions, even the largest ones, can
profit from scale economies. Moreover, the calculated elasticities are
significantly different from 1, indicting that substantial cost savings can be
obtained. Therefore, one can conclude that further consolidation still could
result in cost savings in Europe, since scale economies will be exploited
further. This is also in line with the recommendation of CPSS and IOSCO
concerning efficiency that was mentioned in the introduction.
A stable and efficient clearing and settlement system needs to exploit all
possible efficiency gains. This concerns not only technical efficiency, which
implies that output is produced in an efficient way, but also allocative
efficiency, which states that the institutions should charge competitive prices.
As argued in Van Cayseele (2004) and Serifsoy and Weiss (2005), it is not
obvious to combine these two objectives in an industry where large scale
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infrastructure which charges competitive prices but foregoes important scale
and scope economies needs to be balanced against a configuration where
there is a concentrated infrastructure that optimally exploits these economies
but with the risk of acting more independently from consumers interests
(governances practices that are not discussed here could at least partially
overcome this concern). In fact, this is where the main difference between
domestic and cross-border trading is located. On the domestic level, there are
a limited number of providers, often there is only one CSD in every country
with some few specialised banks offering settlement and custody services. On
the cross-border level however, the fragmentation of the infrastructure is
a source of additional costs (lack of harmonisation and interoperability) and
the size of the individual providers would not allow to optimally take
advantage of the economies of scale and scope in the clearing and settlement
industry. Therefore, further horizontal consolidation can give rise to a better
exploitation of efficiency gains, as shows from the empirical part of this
contribution. The European Commission also aims at the liberalisation and
integration of the clearing and settlement industry in Europe combined with
a continued application of competition policy. Essentially, this is
a combination of applying technical and allocative efficiency, and hence is
confirmed by the results of the present study, which introduced the
appropriate econometric tools for investigating panel data in the debate.
Conclusion 47
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In this appendix, we regress one output variable on the other. The estimated
coefficients are used to forecast the values of ln(VHold) when calculating
economies of scale in section 6.3 according to equation (10).
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Société Universitaire Européenne de Recherches Financières 
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founded in 1963 as a European-wide forum with the aim of bringing together
professionals from both the practitioner and academic sides of finance who
have an interest in the working of financial markets, institutions and systems,
and the conduct of monetary and regulatory policy.
SUERF is a network association of central bankers, bankers and other
practitioners in the financial sector, and academics with the purpose of
analysing and understanding European financial markets, institutions and
systems, and the conduct of regulation and monetary policy. It organises
regular Colloquia, lectures and seminars and each year publishes several
analytical studies in the form of SUERF Studies.
SUERF has its full-time permanent Executive Office and Secretariat located
at the Austrian National Bank in Vienna. It is financed by annual corporate,
personal and academic institution membership fees. Corporate membership
currently includes major European financial institutions and Central Banks.
SUERF is strongly supported by Central Banks in Europe and its membership
comprises most of Europe’s Central Banks (29 in total, including the Bank for
International Settlements and the European Central Bank), banks, other
financial institutions and academics.
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